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The relationship between Eurozone members and non-euro states has been cited by David
Cameron as one of the key issues in his attempted renegotiation of the UK’s EU membership.
Nicolai von Ondarza writes that while some actors have proposed stronger blocking powers for
non-euro states, a far better arrangement would be to simply give these countries the power to
delay decisions. He argues this would generate increased public scrutiny over outcomes,
encouraging Eurozone members to ﬁnd a suitable compromise that takes the views of non-euro
states into account.
In the public debate surrounding the British demands for EU reform, most attention has focused on migration.
Controversial as this issue may be, the most important element for the future place of the UK in the EU is arguably a
diﬀerent one – the relationship between the Eurozone and non-euro states in the single market. But while
safeguards against discrimination by the Eurozone are legitimate, the EU should resist calls to introduce any
mechanism that amounts to a quasi-veto for the non-euro states. Instead, a mechanism that drives political
compromise would be to the beneﬁt of the UK, the Eurozone and the single market.
Fear of discrimination
Cameron’s demands on ‘economic governance’, i.e. the relationship between euro ‘ins and outs’, has put two very
distinct issues on the table. First, the UK prime minister is calling for a ban on discrimination and greater
transparency in Eurozone decision-making. As one example of discrimination, British Chancellor George Osborne
cited an ECB decision of 2011 under which clearing houses trading primarily in euros must also be based in the
Eurozone. From the British perspective this decision clearly discriminated against the City of London. The UK
subsequently successfully challenged the decision before the European Court of Justice.
From the European perspective this concern should also be regarded as legitimate. Enhanced cooperation, the
general tool in the EU treaty framework for diﬀerentiated integration, already stipulates that decisions made under
its scope must have no discriminatory eﬀect on the internal market. In its ruling on the ECB decision, the European
Court of Justice suggests that this principle also applies implicitly in relation to the Eurozone. A legal anchoring of
such a prohibition of discrimination would therefore be acceptable to the Eurozone and the EU. And as long as this
principle can only be enforced through the courts, the decision-making of the Eurozone would not be impaired.
The unfounded fear of a Eurozone caucus
A second issue is the question of safeguards against a ‘Eurozone caucus’ emerging in general EU decisions. This
possibility has existed since November 2014, when a transition period expired and the decision-making procedures
of the Lisbon Treaty fully came into force. Under the new arrangement, euro states now possess a qualiﬁed majority
on their own so they could, in theory, push through decisions even against all nine non-euro states. This is assuming
that they were able to agree in advance on a joint position.
But in reality the Eurozone is further away than ever from such a uniﬁed position. During the debt crisis and the
protracted Greek rescue, fundamental diﬀerences in economic policy alignment – not least between Berlin and
Paris – have snowballed into open disagreement. Equally signiﬁcant, no structural dominance of the euro states can
be discerned in practice, not even towards the United Kingdom. Examining the roughly seven hundred votes the
Council of the EU has published since 2009, the United Kingdom was outvoted in 12.6 per cent of cases (43 no
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votes, 46 abstentions).
That is by far the highest ﬁgure of all the EU states. But this has little to do with its status as a non-euro state. The
next three on the list are Austria, Germany (each 5.6 per cent) and the Netherlands (4.8 per cent), all three of which
are euro states. Moreover, of the ﬁfteen states with which the United Kingdom most frequently voted together, only
two are non-euro states (Sweden and Denmark), the rest are euro states. In practice, there is clearly no Eurozone
caucus at present.
No quasi-veto
What further complicates the negotiation in this area is that David Cameron has not laid out a speciﬁc demand on
how to avoid a perceived Eurozone caucus, but merely insists that questions that aﬀect all member-states must also
be negotiated and decided by all. However, two principal options are under discussion, both of which are
unacceptable to the Eurozone for diﬀerent reasons:
On the one hand, the British think tank Open Europe and others have proposed new blocking options for non-euro
states, to permit them to continue to assemble a blocking minority. The model for this is the special arrangements
for the European Banking Authority (EBA), in which important decisions require a majority among both euro
members and non-euro members. Thus ﬁve non-euro states possess a de facto weight equal to that of ten euro
states.
Applied to the EU as a whole, the proposal is that the threshold to block decisions in the Council should be
signiﬁcantly lowered, so that either three non-euro states or states representing 20 instead of 35 per cent of the EU
population could block a proposal. In essence, both proposals would make it signiﬁcantly easier for London as the
most populous non-euro state to stop any EU initiatives it disapproved of, even if not directly connected to the
Eurozone, such as on ﬁnancial market regulation. This would hamper the decision-making capabilities of the EU and
could even be abused by other member states.
The second option discussed in London – an ‘emergency brake’ for non-euro states in the internal market – is
problematic for other reasons. The EU already has such emergency brakes, for example in justice and home aﬀairs,
where a group of EU states can in certain cases stop a legislative procedure in the Council and have it referred to
the European Council. The latter then has four months to reach an agreement, but now by consensus. If that cannot
be achieved, the other EU states can establish an enhanced cooperation via a simpliﬁed procedure.
This proposal comes with two central problems. First, the treaty framework forbids the use of enhanced cooperation
in areas that would endanger the internal market, turning this in essence into a quasi-veto on ﬁnancial regulation.
Second, from the British perspective, forcing diﬀerentiation could in some instances even be advantageous, if it
permitted the City of London to insulate itself from stricter regulation in the rest of Europe. For example, the British
government vehemently rejects the cap on bankers’ bonuses adopted by the EU in 2013 and would certainly have
used an ‘emergency brake’ to detach itself from this to gain a competitive advantage, even in matters where the
decision had nothing to do with the relationship between euro and non-euro states.
A mechanism for political compromise
Thus, from the European and German perspectives, neither of the two proposals are acceptable. Lessons should
instead be drawn from the one case that British representatives cite as a prime example of a Eurozone ‘caucus’: in
the summer of 2015, the European Commission proposed to use the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism
(EFSM) to assign bridge funding to Greece. However, the EFSM is funded by all twenty-eight member states and
the non-euro states were given a political commitment in 2011 that it would no longer be used to support euro
states.
Britain, whose prime minister had explicitly promised not to participate in rescuing euro states, was extremely
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displeased, as were Sweden and Poland. In subsequent negotiations, it was agreed that while the EFSM could be
used, the non-euro states received a guarantee that the euro states would bear their losses in the event of Greece
becoming insolvent during the bridging period. The decisive aspect here is less the technical nature of the
agreement but rather the political solution, which ultimately led to a compromise acceptable to all. So what the
Eurozone and the non-euro states need are not new blocking instruments, but a mechanism that forces compromise
in an increasingly diﬀerentiated Union.
A solution to guarantee a fair relationship between euro ins and outs could therefore be to implement the emergency
brake proposal in a purely suspensive form. Under this model any EU state that believed the fundamental principles
of equal participation had been violated could delay a legislative procedure in the Council for a maximum of three
months or until the next European Council, whichever comes ﬁrst. This period of heightened political attention would
force the heads of state and government to search for a compromise.
If they fail, the decision can be taken anyway. But the majority must then accept that it is outvoting the minority
under full public scrutiny. This approach would avoid decisions being held up indeﬁnitely, while the pressure to ﬁnd a
compromise could contribute considerably more to cohesion in the Union than divisive new veto options.
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